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Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause: The
Supreme Court as Catalyst for Spurring Legislative
Gridlock in State Income Tax Reform
“[T]hese determinations must continue to be made by the courts, unless the
national interests are to be sacrificed until the heavy machinery of Congress can
be set in motion.” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The past few decades have witnessed courts, Congress, and
commentators struggle to define the reach of a state’s taxing power
over corporations’ interstate income. During this same period, ecommerce has expanded at exponential rates, followed closely by a
concomitant increase in attempts by states to tax out-of-state
corporations doing business in their jurisdictions. Over thirty years
ago, the Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady 2 laid out a
four-part test to evaluate the constitutionality of state taxes
burdening out-of-state interests: (1) whether the activity taxed has a
substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) whether the tax is fairly
apportioned to the taxing jurisdiction; (3) whether the tax
discriminates against interstate commerce; and (4) whether the tax
is fairly related to the services the state provides the taxpayer. 3
Though this framework seems facially straightforward, its
application in practice is quite challenging. A simple example will
suffice to highlight the test’s practical complexity.
Suppose that Corporation X, physically located in California,
provides an online service exclusively to customers in New York and
California, and derives 80% of its revenue from New York customers
and 20% of its revenue from California customers. Which state
should be able to tax Corporation X’s revenue—California, New
York, or both? Each state will undoubtedly wish to lay a claim on as
much of Corporation X’s income as possible, but, obviously, both
states will not be free to tax all of Corporation X’s income because
1. Samuel Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed
“Human Life” Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333, 389 n.176 (1982).
2. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
3. Id. at 279.
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such double taxation would violate the second prong of the Complete
Auto test requiring fair apportionment. Perhaps California should
have the exclusive power to tax 100% of Corporation X’s income
because Corporation X has an exclusive physical nexus with
California. After all, Corporation X derives the lion’s share of its
benefits from the public amenities provided by California’s tax
dollars, such as roads, schools, and law enforcement.
But New York also provides valuable benefits to Corporation X.
Indeed, New York’s customer base is uniquely attuned to
Corporation X’s service offering. If not for New York’s stable
economy, infrastructure, and public education, delivered through its
tax dollars, Corporation X’s New York customers would not be in a
position to purchase Corporation X’s services. While Corporation X
does not have a physical nexus with New York as it does with
California, it could still be said to have a substantial “economic
nexus” with New York, evidenced by the fact that it is from New
York that Corporation X derives the majority of its revenue. Should
New York be allowed to ask Corporation X for a return on the
benefits it provides to Corporation X, even though an “economic
nexus” with New York is less direct—and arguably less substantial—
than California’s nexus measured by actual physical presence within
its jurisdictional boundaries?
Whether so-called “economic nexus” is sufficient to establish a
“substantial nexus” under Complete Auto is a matter of heated debate.
Another contested issue revolves around Complete Auto’s second
prong—fair apportionment. Given that both states provide certain
unquantifiable benefits to Corporation X, scholars debate how best
to achieve a “fair” apportionment of corporate income among states
so as to achieve a tax that is fairly related to state-provided benefits.
The Supreme Court has refused to establish a single “fair”
apportionment practice or formula for fear of treading on states’
rights, preferring instead to resolve fairness disputes on a case-bycase basis. 4 But the absence of a single apportionment formula
applicable to all states has created a patchwork of state-by-state
apportionment formulae that often subjects multi-state corporations
to combined state taxation on more than 100% of their income. And
corporations are not the only ones that suffer from this currently

4. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978); Container Corp. of Am.
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 171 (1983).
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fragmented system. States also suffer from lack of uniform standards
because multi-state corporations have learned that they must play
the federal and state governments against each other to minimize
their state tax liability and avoid taxation on more than 100 percent
of their income. 5 Consequently, many state coffers already suffering
from the recent economic downturn are being further depleted. 6
To reform the current mishmash of inconsistent state policies
regarding the taxation of multi-state corporate income, some have
proposed federal statutory solutions that would modernize the
system and impose uniform taxing standards upon the states. 7
Indeed, some proponents of this solution posit that only Congress
can repair the broken system, restore predictability and
administrative fairness to taxpayers, and ensure a more stable and
equitable revenue stream to the states.8 Though these federal
statutory solutions are theoretically sound, their practical value
hinges entirely on their ability to emerge from legislative committee
and enter the statute books. Congress’s track record on state income
tax legislation, however, suggests that adoption of this (or any)
solution is unlikely. To date, congressional committees have
proposed several bills aimed at streamlining the state income tax
system, but all have died in committee. 9 This political stalemate
highlights one major difficulty of implementing a proper solution to
the current debacle.
The Supreme Court has only compounded the problem by
repeatedly refusing to offer constitutional guidance on the
appropriate reach of state taxing power. The Court has instead

5. See, e.g., Gary Cornia et al., The Disappearing State Corporate Income Tax, 58 NAT’L TAX J.
115, 136 (2005).
6. Taxpayer pursuit of rent-seeking and tax planning opportunities is an influential
factor in the significant decline of state tax revenue over the past three decades. See id.
7. See, e.g., Quinn T. Ryan, Beyond BATSA: Getting Serious About State Corporate Tax
Reform, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275, 307–14 (2010); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of
Economic Nexus, 13 Fla. Tax Rev. 157, 211 (2012).
8. Ryan, supra note 7, at 326; David M. Hudson Daniel, International and Interstate
Approaches to Taxing Business Income, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 562, 614 (1984) (“Interstate
uniformity can only be achieved by Congressional action.”).
9. E.g., Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2009, H.R. 1083, 111th Cong.
(2009); Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2011, H.R. 1439, 112th Cong. (2011);
Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2013, H.R. 2992, 113th Cong. (2013); New Economy
Tax Fairness Act, S.2401, 106th Cong. (2000); Comprehensive Tax Restructuring and
Simplification Act of 1994, S.2160 (1994); see also Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Difficulty of Getting
Serious About State Corporate Tax Reform, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 327 (2010).
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chosen to defer to Congress out of ostensible respect for the
separation of powers doctrine. Yet without an external catalyst to
propel a viable solution through legislative gridlock, these prior bills’
burials in the legislative graveyard will continue to foreshadow a
similar fate for future statutory proposals. This Comment argues
that the Supreme Court should fill this catalytic role—and can do so
constitutionally—by acting pursuant to its dormant commerce
power. Doing so will allow the Court to correct longstanding
problems with the state corporate income tax system that have
plagued both states and taxpayers for several decades.
A Supreme Court ruling in this area is constitutionally
permissible despite the fact that interstate taxation heavily involves
questions of interstate commerce—an area constitutionally assigned
to Congress. Although the Constitution has granted Congress the
final say on laws touching interstate commerce, the Supreme Court
is free (until Congress acts) to utilize the dormant Commerce Clause
to prevent states from unduly burdening interstate commerce. 10 The
Court’s invocation of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is
valuable because such decisions provide at least temporary solutions
to national problems touching interstate commerce and often spur
Congress to fashion enduring legislative solutions pursuant to its
affirmative commerce power.
Despite the value of such decisions, the Court has historically
been reticent to decide cases in the area of state income taxation,
declaring instead that the appropriate course is to exercise judicial
restraint and leave such decisions to the political process. 11 But the
Court’s hands-off approach in the realm of the dormant Commerce
Clause is not as compelled as the Court has represented. In fact, as
this Comment suggests, traditional rationales supporting judicial
restraint are inherently weaker in the realm of dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Additionally, in light of the well-accepted
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. E.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978) (“It is clear that the
legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply
justify the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the
division of income. It is to that body, and not this Court, that the Constitution has committed
such policy decisions.”); see also Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
476 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 546–
47 (1950); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188–89 (1940) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 449 (1939) (Black, J.,
dissenting); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 327 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
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pattern of Court intervention under the dormant Commerce Clause,
the Court does not act beyond its powers by appropriately deciding
state income tax cases involving the uniquely constitutional issues of
state apportionment and nexus standards.
Despite calls for judicial deference for fear that such decisions
will irreversibly deplete the Court’s political capital, 12 the theory of
the dormant Commerce Clause itself ensures that the Court’s
legitimacy will emerge unscathed after exercise of its dormant
commerce power. When the Supreme Court renders a decision
under the dormant Commerce Clause, it is essentially making a
“remand to Congress.” 13 Accordingly, subsequent statutory reversal
of the Court’s decisions in this arena cannot be perceived as a
chastising blow from a co-equal branch of government. Rather,
because the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause decisions are
provided with the understanding that Congress retains full
legislative power over issues of interstate commerce, any subsequent
legislative actions is, in reality, an appropriate response to the
Court’s “remand.” 14
In this light, statutory reversal of the Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause decisions should have minimal impact on the
Court’s perceived legitimacy. Therefore, proposals for judicial
restraint based on the assumption that the Court will theoretically
lose its legitimacy should yield to the important interest in bringing
stability and predictability to this muddled area of law. The need for
the Court’s clarification is especially acute in the area of multi-state
taxation as business increasingly is conducted electronically and
across state borders. In this environment, the obsolescence of
anachronistic nexus standards requiring “physical presence”
becomes ever more obvious.

12. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 94–95
(1978) (“The Court’s effectiveness . . . depends substantially on confidence . . . . [T]here is
a natural quantitative limit to the number of major, principled interventions the Court can
permit itself . . . . A Court unmindful of this limit will find that more and more of its
pronouncements are unfulfilled promises, which will ultimately discredit and denude the
function of constitutional adjudication.”); see also, JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 139, 169 (1980) (speaking of the Court’s public prestige and
institutional capital).
13. See Estreicher, supra note 1, at 389 (referring to the Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause decisions as a “remand to Congress”).
14. Id.
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Part II of this Comment begins by surveying the Supreme Court
jurisprudence governing the states’ power to tax, specifically
outlining the dormant Commerce Clause and its applicability to state
taxation. Part III then illustrates the current income-tax conundrum,
points to a solution, and demonstrates why the political process, by
itself, will continue to fail in implementing any solution to the
problem. Part IV will then briefly explore the various roles of the
Supreme Court—especially its role as a catalyst for federal
congressional action and will cite a few historical examples of the
Court fulfilling this role. Finally, Part V will briefly conclude by
advocating judicial review of state corporate income taxation
schemes pursuant to the Court’s dormant commerce power as a
catalyst for meaningful legislative reform in the area of state income
taxation.
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE GOVERNING STATE POWERS OF
TAXATION
Most cases dealing with the boundaries of a state’s taxing power
have arisen under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Commerce Clause. To understand why, it is necessary to take a short
detour into the history of the Court’s constitutional interpretation of
the Commerce Clause, and, specifically, the judicially created
doctrine of the negative or dormant Commerce Clause. 15 After a
general introduction to the doctrine, the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis applied to state taxation will be explored.

A. The Dormant Commerce Clause Generally
Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. 16 Accordingly,
15. As a textual matter, of course, there is no “dormant Commerce Clause” in the
Constitution; Article I Section 8 contains only an affirmative grant of power to Congress. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. When scholars and courts speak of the dormant Commerce Clause, they
are referring only to a judicially created doctrine, which interprets Article I’s Commerce Clause
to grant courts—by negative implication—the power to invalidate state actions that unduly
burden interstate commerce. See infra Part II.A.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have power . . . to regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.”). The argument implying that Congress’s interstate
commerce power is exclusive can be traced back to a statement made by Chief Justice John
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, explaining that “when a State proceeds to regulate commerce . . .
among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is
doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.” 22 U.S. 1, 199–200 (1824).
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federal law preempts state and local law in this area once Congress
has acted pursuant to its commerce power. But the question remains
whether the federal judiciary should step in—in the absence of
congressional legislation—to invalidate state laws because they place
an undue burden on interstate commerce. The dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine has developed to answer that question in the
affirmative.
The Supreme Court has inferred that the Constitution’s
exclusive grant of commerce power to Congress prohibits, by
negative implication, regulation of interstate commerce by the states
themselves. 17 And the doctrine permits the Court to review state
and local laws challenged as unduly hindering interstate commerce
even where Congress has not yet legislated—in other words, where
its commerce power essentially lies dormant. 18 Simply put, the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine grants federal courts power, in
the absence of congressional legislation, to leave interstate
commerce unregulated by striking down state laws that unduly burden
it. 19 The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine exists to diffuse one of
the framers’ primary concerns addressed in the Constitutional
Convention; that is, preventing the states from engaging in economic
protectionism that strained state relations under the Articles of
Confederation and threatened national unity and stability. 20
Therefore, the Supreme Court routinely strikes down state
regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause when such
regulations run counter to the constitutional principle that a state
must not favor itself at the expense of other states or the nation as a
whole.21
17. It is due to this negative implication that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is
sometimes referred to as the negative commerce clause doctrine. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995) (“Despite the express grant to
Congress of the power to ‘regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,’ . . . we have
consistently held this language to contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant
Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state taxation even when Congress has failed to legislate
on the subject.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)).
18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 419 (3d ed.
2006).
19. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
18 (1937) (“[T]he Commerce Clause, by its own force and without national legislation, puts it
into the power of the Court to place limits on state authority.”).
20. See Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1986).
21. E.g., id.; C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)
(holding that a local ordinance impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce and
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B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Applied to State Taxation
1. The Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause as Jurisdictional
Limitations on State Taxation
In general, there are two great jurisdictional limitations on the
state’s ability to tax: (1) the Due Process Clause, and (2) the
Commerce Clause. If these limitations are breached by state
legislation, then the Supreme Court may strike it down. Both the
Due Process and Commerce clauses impose a “nexus” or minimum
connection requirement between the taxing state and the entity the
state seeks to tax.22 However, “[d]espite the similarity in phrasing,
the nexus requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses
are not identical.” 23 The due process nexus analysis in state tax
cases is beyond the scope of this Comment, but it largely follows the
minimum contacts test the Court has advanced to determine
whether a state court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a civil
defendant. 24 In essence, the Due Process minimum contacts test
serves as a “proxy for notice” that the defendant will be subject to
the state’s jurisdiction. 25 Notably, the minimum contacts test has
evolved over time to keep pace with current economic realities in
which “many commercial transactions touch two or more states.” 26
By jettisoning archaic physical-presence nexus requirements, 27 the
Court’s minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction now elevates
substance over form by allowing a forum state to exercise personal

thus violated the dormant Commerce Clause when it required that all solid waste processed or
handled within town be done solely at its own transfer station); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S.
460, 473–74 (2005) (holding that state statutes prohibiting out-of-state wineries from shipping
wine directly to in-state consumers, but permitting in-state wineries to do so if licensed, violated
the dormant Commerce Clause); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564 (1997) (holding that a state’s property tax exemption statute, which singled out
nonprofit institutions that served mostly state residents for beneficial tax treatment and
penalized those institutions that did principally interstate business, violated the dormant
Commerce Clause).
22. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
25. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992).
26. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957).
27. See, for example, the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), which
overruled the physical presence requirement for in rem jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877), and held the minimum contacts test to be the governing standard in
personal jurisdiction analyses.
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jurisdiction over an entity that merely “purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,” 28 even
if the entity does not have a physical presence in the state.29 Thus, a
business that purposefully avails itself of economic opportunities in
a given state has notice sufficient for due process that it will be
subject to that state’s taxing powers.
In addition to satisfying due process standards, a state tax must
also satisfy the requirements of the Commerce Clause to be rendered
constitutional. In Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, the Supreme Court
held that a state tax is valid under the Commerce Clause only if it
(1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided
by the state. 30 The first and fourth prongs combined are a corollary
of the Due Process’ nexus requirement, but unlike the minimum
contacts test (which serves a notice function), the first and fourth
prongs of Complete Auto work together to limit the reach of a state’s
taxing power to “ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden
interstate commerce.” 31 Because the purposes of the two nexus
requirements are different, it is possible for a corporation to “have
the ‘minimum contacts’ with a taxing state as required by the Due
Process Clause, and yet lack the ‘substantial nexus’ with that State
as required by the Commerce Clause.” 32 For example, while a
taxpayer clearly may have minimum contacts with a state without
maintaining a physical presence in the state, in at least some
instances the Commerce Clause’s “substantial nexus” requirement
will be satisfied only if the taxpaying entity is physically present in
the taxing state’s jurisdiction.
The Court first drew this clear distinction between the Due
Process and Commerce Clause nexus requirements in Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota. 33 In that case, the Court grappled with the issue of
28. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
29. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“So long as a
commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have
consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal
jurisdiction there.”).
30. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
31. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 314.
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whether a nonresident mail-order retailer had the duty to collect and
remit sales taxes on behalf of its North Dakota customers. 34 The
North Dakota law in question imposed a collection duty on any
vendor that advertised three or more times per year in the state. 35
Although Quill, the mail-order retailer, had no physical presence in
North Dakota, the company generated a significant amount of
revenue from North Dakota customers through mail-order catalogs,
periodical advertising, and telephone calls. 36 The Court had no
problem finding the Due Process Clause’s minimum contacts
requirement satisfied in this case because Quill had purposefully
availed itself of the benefits of the taxing jurisdiction. 37 But the
Court ultimately decided that the Commerce Clause’s “substantial
nexus” requirement was not met.
Justice Sevens reasoned that imposing a sales tax collection duty
on Quill would place an undue burden on interstate commerce by
imposing upon a nonresident corporation the duty to collect taxes
from customers utilizing the tax rates of a potential pool of over
6,000 state and local tax jurisdictions. 38 Thus, the Court held that
the state must first establish a substantial nexus with the
nonresident corporation before it can impose a collection duty upon
it. This substantial nexus, as Court stated, is demonstrated by the
corporation’s physical presence in that state. 39 In so deciding, the
Court affirmed its holding in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Deparment of
Revenue,40 which carved out a bright-line exception for nonresident
mail-order companies without a physical presence in the taxing
state’s jurisdiction. 41 The Court admitted that a nexus test analyzing
only physical presence was “artificial at its edges.” 42 But the Court
reasoned that the downsides of artificiality would be offset by the
clarity of a bright-line rule, the benefits of stare decisis principles,
34. Id. at 301.
35. Id. at 303–04.
36. Id. at 302.
37. Id. at 308.
38. Id. at 313 n.6.
39. Id. at 314.
40. 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
41. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 317 (“[A]lthough in [other cases] we have not adopted a
similar bright-line, physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in those cases does not compel
that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes.”
(alterations in original)).
42. Id. at 315.
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and the need to leave undisturbed the “settled expectations” in the
sales and use tax realm. 43 Importantly, the Court explained that its
decision was made easier by the fact that “the underlying issue is not
only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also
one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve[,]” noting that
“Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions.” 44 Rather
than overturn its previous decision, the Court found the more
prudent path to be one of ostensible judicial restraint, finalizing its
decision with the declaration that “the better part of both wisdom
and valor is to respect the judgment of the other branches of
government.” 45

2. Physical Presence or Economic Nexus?
The current debate surrounding Complete Auto’s four-pronged test
deals in part with defining the scope of the “substantial nexus”
prong. Because the Quill Court cabined its physical presence
requirement to apply only to a state’s sales and use tax jurisdiction,
the question remains open whether the same physical presence
requirement should extend to business activity taxes (corporate
income, franchise, excise, or gross receipts taxes). In the wake of
Quill, Congress, states, lower courts, and scholars have disagreed on
the reach of Quill’s physical presence mandate. Some argue that the
physical presence standard should be applicable to all state taxes,46
while others argue that a more functional, “economic nexus”
standard should apply to non-sales and use taxes. 47 Of course, the
arguments on both sides of this debate are informed only by
normative judgments because after Quill, neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court, outside of the sales and use tax context, has
endorsed physical presence or economic nexus as the governing
43. Id. at 315–16.
44. Id. at 318.
45. Id. at 319 (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 637 (1981)
(White, J., concurring)).
46. See, e.g., Megan A. Stombock, Economic Nexus and Nonresident Corporate Taxpayers: How
Far Will It Go?, 61 TAX LAW. 1225, 1242 (2008); Scott D. Smith & Sharlene Amitay, Economic
Nexus: An Unworkable Standard for Jurisdiction, 25 STATE TAX NOTES 787 (2002).
47. See, e.g., Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical “Physical Presence”
Constitutional Standard, 54 TAX LAW. 105 (2000); Christina R. Edson, Quill’s Constitutional
Jurisprudence and Tax Nexus Standards in an Age of Electronic Commerce, 49 TAX LAW. 893, 942–47
(1995); John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 373–93 (2003).
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standard for satisfying the “substantial nexus” prong of Complete
Auto. 48
Some lower federal and state courts have narrowly construed
Quill’s holding to apply only to a state’s jurisdiction over sales and
use taxes, but not to its jurisdiction over state income taxes. 49 In
these cases, the courts are often applying a more comprehensive
“economic nexus” standard, which is akin to the “minimum
contacts” test and the “purposeful availment” standard of the Due
Process nexus analysis. 50 The most persuasive arguments for
denying extension of the physical-presence standard were illustrated
in a case in which West Virginia’s highest court permitted West
Virginia to impose corporate and franchise taxes on a nonresident
corporation with no physical presence in the state because the
corporation derived economic benefits from sales it made to West
Virginia customers. 51 The court proffered four justifications for
refusing to extend the physical presence requirement to state
corporate income taxes: (1) the Quill decision was based on
principles of stare decisis and not on sound policy; (2) the Quill
Court itself limited the language of the physical presence standard to
include only sales and use taxes, rather than applying it universally
to all state taxes; (3) the compliance burdens imposed by state
income taxes are far less than for sales and use taxes; and (4) the
technological innovations and economic realities that emerged since
Quill have rendered the physical presence standard ineffective and
obsolete. 52
Conversely, other states and federal courts have determined that
Quill’s physical presence mandate does extend to state jurisdiction
over income-based taxes. 53 An oft-cited rationale for this approach
48. See Megan A. Stombock, Economic Nexus and Nonresident Corporate Taxpayers: How Far
Will it Go?, 61 TAX LAW. 1225, 1227 (2007).
49. See, e.g., KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 328 (Iowa 2010).
50. See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc. v. S. Carolina Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993).
51. Comm’r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 235–236 (W. Va. 2006) cert.
denied, 551 U.S. 1141 (2007).
52. Id. at 234 (“[T]he development and proliferation of communication technology . . .
now makes it possible for an entity to have a significant economic presence in a state absent any
physical presence there. For this reason . . . the mechanical application of a physical-presence
standard to franchise and income taxes is a poor measuring stick of an entity’s true nexus with a
state.”).
53. E.g., J.C. Penney Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 927 (2000).
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involves an analysis of comparative burdens between a state’s
imposition of sales tax collection duties and its direct income tax
obligations. 54 Proponents of a narrow application of Quill argue that
granting a state sales tax jurisdiction imposes only an administrative
burden on the nonresident corporation as it merely requires the
collection and remittance of the customer’s sales tax obligation,
whereas an income tax, on the other hand, is imposed directly on the
corporation’s earnings. 55 Thus, the argument goes, because the
imposition of a direct income tax is more onerous than the
imposition of a mere duty to collect sales taxes imposed upon
others, the substantial nexus requirements for income taxes should
be at least as stringent as those imposed for sales tax purposes.
Additionally, many proponents of the physical presence standard
gravitate to the justification cited in Quill relating to the value of
clarity and predictability stemming from a bright-line rule. Because
actual physical presence is easier to determine than a case-by-case,
totality-of-the-circumstances economic presence standard, some
commentators argue that compliance burdens on multi-state
corporations would be even more burdensome under an economic
nexus standard. 56
Both sides of the debate marshal compelling arguments in
support of their position, which likely fuels the wide disparity among
states in the application of varying nexus standards. But argument
over which side of the debate is normatively correct misses the
point: the real problem lies in the state-by-state application of nonuniform nexus standards. As developing technologies increase the
prevalence of commerce conducted almost wholly interstate,
increasing numbers of states are devising new tax schemes to
capture more of this interstate income. And as corporations devise
new ways to evade those taxes, the need for an effective uniform
solution becomes more acute.

54. R. Todd Ervin, Comment, The Taxation of Financial Institutions: Will Physical Presence or
Economic Presence Win the Day?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 515, 544 (2000) (“[A] sales and use tax is
nothing more than a collection duty imposed on the taxpayer, whereas a direct income tax is
actually borne by the taxpayer.”).
55. Ryan, supra note 7, at 301.
56. WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX 2–4 (2005).
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3. Problems created by inconsistent application of multiple nexus standards and
state apportionment formulas
Apportionment formulae vary widely among the states. Many factors
contribute to the overall tax burden on a multi-state corporation.
Thus far, the focus in this Comment has been on the threshold
determination—the substantial nexus standard—but an equally
important input into a corporation’s state income tax equation is a
given state’s apportionment formula. The apportionment formula is
what states use to determine what portion of a corporation’s global
revenue is attributable, and therefore taxable, to each state.57 Most
states have adopted an apportionment formula, which takes a
weighted average of the individual state’s proportion of three
inputs—sales, property, and payroll—to come up with an overall
percentage of a corporation’s global income that is fairly attributable
to that state. 58 So, for example, assuming an equally weighted
apportionment formula, if a corporation had global sales of $1
million, $350,000 of which were sales made in State X, the sales
factor for State X would be 35%.59 The two remaining factors for
property and payroll are determined in like manner. Finally, the
weighted average of all three factors would be taken to determine the
portion of a corporation’s global income a particular state would
have jurisdiction to tax.
The Supreme Court has refused to demand a uniform system of
apportionment by all states, but attempts at creating uniformity have
been made by the Multistate Tax Commission. 60 Nevertheless,
uniformity has never been achieved, either by consensus or
legislation, and apportionment formulae currently vary from state to
state. Many states use a formula that gives double weight to the sales
factor, but still uses property and payroll as inputs. Other states have
attempted to capture more corporate revenue by shifting to a singlesales-factor formula, which, as the name suggests, focuses

57. Inst. On Tax’n & Econ. Pol’y, Corporate Income Tax Apportionment and the “Single Sales
Factor”, 8 POL’Y BRIEF 2 (2012), available at http://itepnet.org/pdf/pb11ssf.pdf.
58. Id. at 1–2.
59. A comprehensive example of the apportionment formula is set forth in Ryan, supra
note 7, at 280.
60. The only restriction the Supreme Court has placed on States’ apportionment formulae
is that they must (1) be fair, and (2) not discriminate against interstate or foreign commerce. See
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169–71 (1983).
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exclusively on the sales factor and disregards property and payroll. 61
The remainder of the states uses a myriad of other apportionment
formulae that weigh different factors according to how each state
feels it will achieve maximum revenue generation. 62
a. Nowhere income. Although allowing states the freedom to
structure their own apportionment formulae may be justified by
principles of federalism, the nonuniformity of income apportionment
among the states creates a situation where multi-state corporations
can be taxed on more—or less—than 100% of their income. 63
Corporations often try to structure their operations so as to leave a
portion of their income untaxed by any state. When a corporation is
successful in doing so, the untaxed portion of a corporation’s income
is often called “nowhere income.” 64 To see how a corporation
achieves nowhere income, consider a hypothetical corporation that
situates all of its production facilities and employees in State X, but
makes all of its sales exclusively in State Y. This corporation may
lobby the State X legislature to require a sales-only apportionment
formula, while lobbying the State Y legislature, where the
corporation makes 100% of its sales, to adopt an equally-weighted
(between property, payroll, and sales) apportionment formula. The
desired result is that the corporation will not be required to
apportion any income to State X (and therefore pay no income tax in
State X) and will be required by State Y to apportion only roughly
one-third of its income to State Y, thereby creating what the industry
has termed “nowhere income”—income that is not subject to tax in
any state—to the tune of roughly two-thirds of its gross income. 65 In
61. Inst. On Tax’n & Econ. Pol’y, Corporate Income Tax Apportionment and the “Single Sales
Factor”, 8 POL’Y BRIEF 2 (2012), available at http://itepnet.org/pdf/pb11ssf.pdf. As of the writing
of this Comment, nearly a dozen states have adopted the single-sales-factor apportionment
formula.
62. For a table of the different apportionment formulae applicable in the several states,
see http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/apport.pdf.
63. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983), the Supreme
Court recognized the problem of overlapping taxation, but noted that in practice, eliminating
this problem would require the Court to establish a single constitutionally mandated method of
taxation and specific rules regarding application of that method in particular contexts. The Court
declined to do this, believing that the task was “essentially legislative,” and left it to Congress to
make this determination. Id. at 171.
64. Michael Mazerov, The “Single Sales Factor” Formula for State Corporate Taxes: A Boon to
Economic Development or a Costly Giveaway?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 24 (rev. 2005),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-27-01sfp.pdf.
65. Indeed, the creation of differing tax structures to achieve maximum “nowhere”
income has been a prominent focus of corporate lobbyists. See Michael Mazerov, Federal “Business
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sum, “the lack of a uniform method of income apportionment among
the states produces undesirable ‘gaps and overlaps in the tax bases of
the various states.’” 66 The opportunity for tax evasion creates
perverse incentives for corporations to divert valuable resources from
socially productive endeavors—like improving the quality of
products or the efficiency of production—to lobbyists and other tax
professionals who can structure corporate operations to take
advantage of these artificial gaps and overlaps.
b. Inconsistent and inequitable tax burdens. The nuanced and
nonuniform system of state corporate income tax schemes among
the states has created inequitable distribution of tax burdens among
corporations doing business in any given state. Indeed, many of the
most profitable nonresident corporations can afford to structure
their business to comply with the letter of the state tax laws—and
manage thereby to avoid much of the income tax burden—while still
exploiting the state’s commercial market. On the other hand,
smaller, local businesses that operate entirely within a state’s
borders are unable to take advantage of the tax loopholes available to
nonresident corporations under the current system. The present
system is consequently an inefficient tool for revenue generation and
has attracted wide criticism. 67 In addition to the system’s
inefficiency in collecting revenue for the states, it often
disadvantages local small businesses and discourages capital
investment by in-state corporations.
c. The idealistic solution to the state income tax debacle. As a threshold
matter, any viable solution to the state income tax debacle requires
three things: (1) a uniform definition of “Unitary Business” (which
would bring certainty to taxpayers wishing to know whether they
must conform to the apportionment and nexus standards), (2) a
uniform apportionment formula applied by all the states (so as to

Activity Tax Nexus” Legislation: Half of a Two-Pronged Strategy to Gut State Corporate Income Taxes,
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PROIRITIES 3 (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-2605sfp.pdf.
66. Ryan, supra note 7, at 284 (quoting Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Nuttiness of State and
Local Taxes—and the Nuttiness of Responses Thereto, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 841, 849 (2002)).
67. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 7, at 298 (quoting David Brinori, Stop Taxing Corporate
Income, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 47, 48 (2002)) (criticizing the current system as “probably the most
inefficient, least cost-effective revenue source available to the states”); Elliott Dubin, Back to the
BAT Cave, MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N 7, 7, available at http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/
Multistate_Tax_Commission/Back%20to%20the%20bat%20Cave_HR1439_A%20GSM%20Edit.
pdf.
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ensure that exactly 100 percent of a corporation’s income is taxed
proportionately among the several states in which it operates), and
(3) uniform nexus standards (which would bring certainty to the
question of whether a corporation is liable to pay tax in any
particular state). Uniformity on these three fronts is widely accepted
in the tax community as the optimal solution to the current
apportionment problem. 68 Consensus is lacking, however, on the
method by which such uniformity should be implemented. In
general, there seem to be two prevailing methods of implementation:
(1) multilateral state action, or (2) federal congressional action.
(1) Multilateral state action. The proposal for
multilateral state action is by far the preferred method of achieving
uniformity on these fronts because it accomplishes the goal of
uniform taxation without outside intervention by the national
government. States certainly have the power to act unilaterally to set
definitions for “unitary business” and to prescribe independent
apportionment formulae and substantial nexus standards. Since each
state individually has the power to act unilaterally, it follows that
states also have the power to act in concert to accomplish the same
ends on a uniform basis. 69 The problem, however, is that states have
not migrated in the direction of uniformity. In fact, in recent years,
the divergence in apportionment formulae among states has widely
increased. 70 Additionally, with regard to nexus standards, the states’
hands are tied by certain federal legislation 71 that imposes
restrictions on the states’ ability to craft their own uniform nexus
standard. 72 Moreover, when states have moved toward uniformity, it
has come only in response to the threat of looming federal legislation
68. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J.
LEGIS. 171, 181–82 (1997) (“[S]cholars have long recognized [the need for uniformity] in state
and local taxation and, as our economy has expanded and state and local taxes have increased in
amount and scope, state tax administrators, scholars, and taxpayers have all become increasingly
sensitive to this need.” (footnotes omitted)); Walter Hellerstein, Federalism in Taxation: The
Case for Greater Uniformity, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 225, 225 (1994) (Book Review) (“[T]he desirability
of achieving uniformity in state taxation is one of the rare matters on which state taxpayers,
state tax administrators, and the adjudicative bodies that resolve their disputes can agree.”).
69. Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Difficulty of Getting Serious About State Corporate Tax Reform,
67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 327, 334–35 (2010).
70. Id. at 335.
71. Interstate Income Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, § 101, 73 Stat. 555 (1959)
exempts from creation of nexus some corporations that sell tangible personal property and have
only certain specified contacts with a given state.
72. McClure, supra note 69, at 335.
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that would impose state uniformity, thereby—in the states’ eyes—
depriving them of their tax sovereignty and potentially decreasing
their revenue.73 But once the impending legislation lost steam,
efforts at cohesive uniformity among the various states subsided,
and most states reverted to their old ways of unilateral action. 74 This
result comes as no surprise given that states generally have no
incentive to act in concert with other states on these matters because
differing standards and definitions are valuable as bargaining chips
to attract investment and to cater to businesses.75 Uniformity would
even the playing field among the states and would deprive some
states of a degree of flexibility in ordering their tax scheme as a tool
for attracting foreign investment and economic growth at the
expense of other states. Given the inherent incentive against
uniformity, therefore, it is unlikely that multilateral state action on
this front will prove an effective method for accomplishing this
important goal.
(2) Federal congressional action. The alternative to
voluntary uniformity through multilateral state action is federally
imposed uniformity through federal legislation. In theory, Congress
could require states to adopt uniform definitions for unitary
business, uniform nexus standards based on economic presence, and
uniform apportionment formulae, thereby eliminating tax planning
strategies and inequitable tax burdens.76 Thoughtful proposals for
federal legislation of this nature are common. 77 Nevertheless,
however theoretically sound a proposal for Congressional legislation
may be, it is only valuable if the proposed legislation is actually
enacted. And as a matter of history, “Congress has not proven to be
an effective forum for state tax reform.” 78 For example, since 1967
when the physical presence nexus standard was enunciated in Bellas

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the
Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 370 (2003). Indeed, at least one empirical academic
study “predicts that Congress is unlikely ever to enact legislation mandating uniformity in state
and local taxation.” Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23
J. LEGIS. 171, 173 (1997). This assumes, of course, that there is no external catalyst to propel
Congress to action. As set forth in the following parts of this Comment, however, the Supreme
Court may spur Congress to action by a judicial ruling.
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Hess, federal legislation that would replace this antiquated standard
with something more akin to economic nexus has been repeatedly
introduced only to fail. 79 Likewise, federal legislation that would
uniformly establish and expand the physical presence standard, a
major culprit in the state income tax conundrum, has been
introduced numerous and consecutive times and met a similar
demise. 80 Congress’s track record on this front has led one
commentator to note that “[a]s a practical political matter . . .
Congress cannot be counted on either to take the lead or to lead in
the right direction.” 81
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, neither multilateral
state action nor federal legislation alone offers tenable solutions.
Both proposals lack sufficient steam to propel wholesale adoption of
appropriate uniform standards, which are necessary to effectively
solve the current morass of state corporate income taxation. This is
so because both states and corporations have an abiding interest in
nonuniformity. Corporations oppose uniformity because nonuniform
standards allow them to shop around among various states and to
play states against each other for the most favorable tax treatment. 82
States are also opposed to uniformity because it would eliminate one
of their levers for attracting corporate investment and would mean a
relinquishment of some degree of states’ taxing sovereignty. 83
Accordingly, the last and probably most effective means of spurring
uniformity is a Supreme Court ruling on the matter—a ruling with
which Congress either agrees and thus will end the debate
conclusively, or one with which Congress disagrees and thus will
provoke Congress to take a definitive stance at odds with the Court’s
ruling.

79. See Swain, supra note 78, at 370.
80. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 321 (stating that the Business Activity Tax Simplification
Act (BATSA), an act which has as one of its primary thrusts the adoption of a physical presence
nexus standard, has been proposed, in various forms, in every Congress since 2003, but that
each proposal of the Act died in Congress).
81. Swain, supra note 78, at 370. While Congress has adopted a solitary statute dealing
with the nexus standard in Public Law 86-272, it has only adopted minor legislation that affects
corporate taxation since then. See Kelley W. Strain, Geoffrey the Giraffe Arrives in Louisiana: Why
Geoffrey Should Not Pay State Income Tax, 6 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 1, 41 (2006) (quoting Kathleen
Leslie Roin, Due Process Limits on State Estate Taxation: An Analogy to the State Corporate Income Tax,
94 YALE L. J. 1229, 1242 n.69 (1985)).
82. See McLure, supra note 69, at 338.
83. Id.
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d. A Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
declined petitions to hear a case that would give it the opportunity to
definitively resolve the substantial nexus standard under the
dormant Commerce Clause. 84 By refusing to hear any cases which
would require it to articulate an appropriate nexus standard, the
Court seems to be clinging to the deferential statement it made in
Quill: that adhering to the antiquated physical presence standard
enunciated in Bellas Hess is motivated by a desire to defer to
Congress’s ultimate power over interstate commerce. 85 The Court
surely is wary about contradicting its principled stance of legislative
deference evidenced by its implied instruction to Congress that, at
least in the use tax arena, it was “now free to decide whether, when,
and to what extent the States may burden interstate [businesses],” 86
thus implying that the Court would no longer be meddling in
decisions regarding substantial nexus standards among the states. 87
However, even though Congress possesses the ultimate power to
resolve this issue, Congress has historically failed to adopt (and is
unlikely to ever adopt) any solution largely because of political
stalemate. In the past, the Supreme Court has not shied away from
issuing rulings regarding state taxes that burden interstate
commerce; 88 in fact, the Court developed the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine for the express purpose of reviewing state actions
that negatively impact interstate commerce. 89 Given congressional
stalemate and inability of the states to act in unison to overcome this
vexing problem, the time is now ripe for the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari to an appropriate case and to adopt the solution that will
84. For recent examples involving petitions for clarification of the nexus ambiguity, see

Lamtec Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 246 P.3d 788 (Wash. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 95 (2011), and
KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 97
(2011)).
85. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
86. Id.
87. The Quill decision seems like an odd exit point for the Court considering the volumes
of case law previously promulgated by the Court, which served to complicate the analysis of
Complete Auto’s “substantial nexus” prong. It appears that the Court surveyed its collateral
damage and decided the current state of confusion (inspired in large part by its own decisions)
would only be exacerbated by further judicial interference and therefore chose the mask of
legislative deference as an excuse to bow out of the nexus debate rather than risk further
compounding the confusion.
88. See Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959); Boston
Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
89. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951).
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promote equity and efficiency to both taxpaying corporations and
states in the modern economic environment. 90 Still, even if the
Supreme Court were willing to issue a ruling that would implement
an appropriate solution, the Court is in a difficult position because it
must do so within the confines of a specific case or controversy
whose facts may not be ideal for propounding this solution in its
entirety. This concern as well as others will be analyzed in the
following Part, which will defend judicial review under the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine and will support this defense with an
analysis of the distinctive roles of the Supreme Court—specifically,
its potential (and less frequently examined) role as a catalyst for
legislative reform.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
THE CATALYTIC ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT

A. A Defense of Judicial Review of State Action Under the Dormant
Commerce Clause
Judicial review of state action involving interstate commerce is
controversial but well established.91 As early as the days of John

90. Any attempt by the Court to implement a comprehensive policy that solves the state
income tax conundrum would likely be met with the argument that such policymaking is
precisely the type of action that should be left entirely to Congress and that would represent an
overreaching of the Court’s judicial bounds into legislative territory. While it may appear so at
first blush, it must be recalled that the Court would be acting under the negative commerce
clause doctrine, so by definition the Court would be acting in the narrow area in which Congress
has the express authority to effectively “overrule” the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court
admitted as much in its Quill decision, noting that “[n]o matter how we evaluate the burdens
that . . . taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our
conclusions.” Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992). Consequently, since the
dormant Commerce Clause arena is one in which it is almost expected that Congress will
eventually chime in on an important issue dealing with burdens on interstate commerce, any
future Congressional statute that contradicts the Court-imposed solution to the problem is very
unlikely to be seen as a lack of Congressional respect for the rulings of the Supreme Court. This
result obtains in stark contrast to the divergent result that may occur in cases involving judicial
activism in an arena other than the dormant Commerce Clause where such action by Congress
could potentially result in the Court’s legitimacy being depreciated. But it is precisely in those
divergent constitutional cases, unlike the dormant Commerce Clause cases, that the justiciability
doctrines and other arguments for judicial restraint find their most compelling application.
Thus, a dormant Commerce Clause decision by the Court is a proper vehicle for at least
initializing reform in the income tax nexus debate.
91. Dormant Commerce Clause opponents dislike the doctrine because it partakes of
legislative action. Critics sometimes denounce the doctrine on separation of powers grounds,
arguing that it is wholly for Congress—not the Judiciary—to regulate commerce and to
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Marshall, the Supreme Court has consistently found that judicial
invalidation of certain state laws is supported by the Constitution
and by democratic theory. 92 Judicial review of state action currently
entails a balancing test that first considers whether the state
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state end, and then
balances the burden on and potential discrimination against
interstate commerce against the state’s interest in enforcing the
legislation. 93 Judicial review under this paradigm is supported by at
least three important rationales—the first two theoretical and the
third practical.
First, judicial review of state legislation is supported by
democratic theory, which recognizes that state legislatures represent
only a local constituency. Accordingly, the democratic processes of
each state will, by their very nature, often favor in-state interests at
the expense of unrepresented out-of-state interests. 94 Because this
“defect” of localism is an inherent trait of a well-functioning,
representative state democracy and is not a symptom of breakdown
in the local democratic process, democratic theory supports judicial
review of a wide range of even ordinary state legislative measures in
order to ensure that interstate commerce is not unduly burdened by
their enactment.95
Second, judicial review of state action under the dormant
Commerce Clause is supported by the fact that the Court’s decisions

invalidate state laws that place an undue burden on interstate commerce. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 18, at 423. Indeed, Supreme Court Justices themselves have disagreed on the
propriety of the doctrine. Justice Thomas, for example, has argued that the doctrine authorizes
the “exercise of judicial power in an area for which there is no textual basis,” and that the Court
is ill-equipped to engage in the extensive “policy-laden decision making” inherent in
determinations regarding regulations on interstate commerce. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc.
v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 612, 620 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Despite such
criticisms, however, the dormant commerce doctrine is well established as a matter of history
and the propriety of Supreme Court decisions invoking the doctrine is largely uncontested.
92. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 408 (1988).
93. Id.; see also, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1945); Cities
Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186–87 (1950).
94. TRIBE, supra note 92, at 409 (There are no inherent problems with state actions that
affect out-of-state interests that have no voice in the state’s democratic process. Speaking
directly to the issue of judicial review in this context, Tribe asserts that “[w]hatever may be the
general merit of a system of judicial review which sanctions intervention by the counterdemocratic courts only when the normal processes of democracy have broken down, that model
is of little use if mechanically applied in the context of interstate commerce, where problems
often arise precisely because the individual states’ democratic processes have worked well.”).
95. Id. at 411.
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are always subject to subsequent congressional review. Because
judicial review under the dormant commerce doctrine derives from
negative implications of the constitutional grant of power to
Congress, the Court’s limitations on state interference are always
subject to congressional revision. 96 Thus, doctrinal criticisms resting
upon separation of powers ideals are weak because the dormant
Commerce Clause is “one of the few areas where Congress has the
clear authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision interpreting the
Constitution.” 97 And since Congress is free to disagree with the
Supreme Court and effectively to “overrule” any of its decisions
rendered in the dormant Commerce Clause realm, any potential
threat of judicial encroachment on Congress’s lawmaking prerogative
through the exercise of this doctrine is nonexistent. 98 Essentially, in
the realm of the dormant Commerce Clause, the relationship
between the Court and Congress is similar to the relationship
between Congress and the Executive in that the latter branch in both
relationships has the ability to exercise veto power over the former
branch’s decisions. Moreover, once a Supreme Court decision has
been “vetoed” or overwritten by an act of Congress, the Supreme
Court is powerless to reinstate its prior decision by any means. 99
Consequently, calls for judicial deference based upon the argument
that the Court’s decision would irrevocably encroach upon the
territory of Congress are unwarranted because Congress will always
have the last word in these inter-branch disputes concerning state
burdens on interstate commerce.
Finally, judicial review of state actions affecting interstate
commerce is appropriate because it is the only efficient (and
arguably the only possible) way to carry out the goal of leaving
interstate commerce substantially unburdened. Opponents of
judicial review would instead favor congressional review of state

96. Id. at 403–04.
97. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 449. See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321 (7th ed. 2004) (“When the Court holds that a state law violates the
dormant commerce clause, Congress can effectively reverse that ruling by enacting federal
legislation . . . .”).
98. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 97, at 321 (“Court actions invalidating state laws
[under] negative commerce clause principles are not truly incompatible with the democratic
process. Rather, such judicial rulings may simply force consideration of multi-state commercial
problems by Congress.”).
99. To continue the analogy, contrast this with Congress’s power to override an
Executive Veto by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress.
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laws that might burden interstate commerce. 100 However, given the
sheer volume of state legislation and Congress’s limited resource of
time, such a proposal would be impossible in practice. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that it is unrealistic to expect
Congress to review every state and local law that may potentially
unduly burden interstate commerce. 101 Thus, in view of the relative
capacities of the two branches, the judiciary is better suited to the
task and is not constitutionally prohibited from assuming it.
Given the rationales discussed above and the longstanding
history of the dormant Commerce Clause in practice, federal judicial
review of state action of all kinds is largely undisputed. Moreover,
judicial review of state taxes under the dormant Commerce Clause is
especially well established. As discussed in greater detail above in
Part II.B.1, judicial review of state burdens on interstate commerce is
governed by Complete Auto’s functional four-part test. Cases involving
judicial review under this test are legion, and there can be no dispute
that such review is well established. Thus, the Court should face no
serious contest in accepting and deciding a case resolving the
persistent lack of uniformity in the state income tax arena.
Having thus demonstrated that the Court can exercise its judicial
powers to decide a state income tax apportionment/nexus case, the
following section makes the case for why the Court should decide
such a case based on its distinctive roles in our tripartite system of
federal government. 102
100. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569 (1987); Thomas K. Anson & P.M.
Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71,
79–85 (1980) (“Congress, not the courts, should decide when to override state regulatory
initiatives for the sake of the national economy.”).
101. See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“[T]hese restraints are individually too petty, too diversified, and too local to get the attention
of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters. . . . The sluggishness of government,
the multitude of matters that clamor for attention, and the relative ease with which men are
persuaded to postpone troublesome decisions, all make inertia one of the most decisive powers
in determining the course of our affairs and frequently gives to the established order of things a
longevity and vitality much beyond its merits.”).
102. The following Parts discuss the broader law- and policy-making functions of the
Supreme Court in order to highlight the normative value of the dialogue that is generated
between Congress and the Judiciary when each branch acts in its respective constitutional
sphere. This discussion is intentionally broader than the scope of this article’s treatment of the
dormant Commerce Clause as applied to state income taxation in order to support this
Comment’s argument that a Supreme Court ruling on this specific issue is desirable, now that
the constitutional permissibility of such a decision has been established above.
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B. The Roles of the Modern Supreme Court

The Supreme Court wears various hats in its contemporary
exercise of judicial power. To fully understand the Court’s traditional
and progressive roles, this Part first will address the theoretical
underpinnings supporting the prohibition against advisory opinions
as it provides a framework for thinking about the propriety of
judicial intervention generally. Second, this Part will survey the
evolution of the role of the judiciary and discuss its capacity as
adjudicator, lawmaker, and policymaker. Third, this Part will
acknowledge the tension between the traditional and progressive
roles of the Court and explore the Supreme Court’s emerging role as
a catalyst for legislative reform. Finally, evidence of the Court’s
catalytic role will be demonstrated through a few brief historical
examples.

1. Justifications for the prohibition against advisory opinions applied to
judicial intervention generally
Article III Section 2 of the Constitution imposes the “cases and
controversies” requirement on the Supreme Court, which limits the
Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicating actual controversies and
disputes. 103 In so doing, this requirement also prohibits the Court
from offering advisory opinions to either the executive or legislative
branches. The prohibition against advisory opinions is at the core of
Article III and restrains the judiciary from advising Congress on the
constitutionality of legislation before it is passed or from opining on
other constitutional issues posed to them by the other branches of
government. 104 Three key policy rationales support this prohibition.
First, the goal of separation of powers is served by “keeping the
courts out of the legislative process.” 105 It is generally accepted that
it is inappropriate for the judicial branch to opine on what laws
should be made because this is a purely legislative function; the
judiciary’s primary function is to adjudicate concrete disputes, not to
advise Congress in its legislative role.
103. In Flast v. Cohen, Chief Justice Warren declared that the Constitution’s delineation of
cases and controversies “define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government.” 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
104. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 53, 60.
105. Id. at 54.

1045

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/27/2014 10:28 AM

2013

Second, this prohibition conserves judicial resources—especially
its store of political capital. 106 If the Court were permitted to offer
nonbinding advice that other branches could easily ignore or
supersede, the vigor and force of Supreme Court rulings would soon
depreciate. The efficacy of Court rulings depends on the other
branches’ voluntary compliance with judicial orders, and such
compliance is conditioned on the Court’s credibility. 107 Thus, the
argument goes, if the Court becomes too loose with its decisions, it
would deplete its reserve of political capital and the other branches
could, at some point, refuse to enforce the Court’s orders. The
prohibition against advisory opinions safeguards the Court’s
legitimacy by placing spending limits on the Court’s political capital
and allowing its expenditure only when necessary. 108
While this second policy justification for judicial restraint may be
theoreticalically valid, historical evidence does not support the
notion that the Court’s political piggy bank is as fragile as this
argument assumes. The legitimacy of the Court has been tested
numerous times with many controversial decisions—some that even
produce calls for complete judicial reform—and yet the judiciary
seems to have had ample support to survive these occasional
storms. 109 In practicality, the Court’s legitimacy appears to be
largely unaffected by each individual Court decision. 110 Because
controversial judicial actions will simultaneously attract support and
alienate different segments of the population, the Court’s legitimacy
appears to largely remain unscathed even after controversial policydriven decisions.
In addition to limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to actual
controversies or disputes, the prohibition against advisory opinions
requires that there be a “substantial likelihood that a [Supreme
Court] decision . . . will bring about some change or have some
effect.” 111 In one of its earliest cases, the Court expressed that the
106. Id. at 51.
107. Id.
108. Id. But see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 134–38 (1987)
(arguing that the Court’s legitimacy is not fragile and that conserving judicial credibility should
not be a primary objective in constitutional interpretation).
109. Gregory A. Caldeira & Kevin T. McGuire, What Americans Know About the Courts and
Why it Matters, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 262, 272–73 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds.,
2005).
110. Id.
111. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 56.

1046

DO NOT DELETE

1021

1/27/2014 10:28 AM

Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause

concern underlying this criterion was the violation of the separation
of powers doctrine. The Court noted that such abstract judicial
declarations would be inappropriate because they could be “revised
and controuled [sic] by the legislature, and . . . . [s]uch revision
and controul we deemed radically inconsistent with the
independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts
. . . .” 112 However, this concern for separation of powers does not
inhere in decisions rendered by the Court in the dormant Commerce
Clause realm because the Court is understood to be filling a gap left
by Congress’s failure to exercise its commerce power. In this way,
the Court acts as an appropriate stop-gap until Congress directly
reviews the issue. Thus, any later revision of the Court’s dormant
Commerce Clause decision is not viewed as a violation of the
judiciary’s independence, but as an appropriate exercise of
Congress’s commerce power. Hence, the dormant Commerce Clause
is unique because it allows both federal branches—Congress and the
Supreme Court—to act in ways that would otherwise be seen as an
encroachment on each other’s separate and independent functions.
Finally, the third justification for the prohibition against advisory
opinions is that it improves judicial decision making by limiting the
Court’s rulings to concrete controversies best suited to judicial
resolution. 113 While the Court plainly must rule on an actual
dispute, its dormant commerce decisions should not be discredited
for their abstract nature. The value of precision in dormant
commerce decisions is not as high as it is in other contexts since
Congress is free to alter or even abolish the Court’s ruling. Because
of this unique characteristic of dormant commerce decisions, their
highest value is not always in their ability to resolve the particular
case in question; rather, it is sometimes in the value of their
statement to the coordinate branches of government.

112. Heyburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Call.) 409, 411 (1792).
113. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 54; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96–97 (1968)
(noting that the prohibition against advisory opinions “recognizes that such suits often are not
pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges
precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every
aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests” (internal
quotation omitted)).
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A. The Supreme Court as Adjudicator, Lawmaker, and Policymaker
The Supreme Court is both a lawmaking and policy-setting
institution. 114 Rather than merely proclaiming what the law is, the
modern Supreme Court participates in policymaking decisions that
are largely informed by public opinion. 115 In this way, the modern
Court partakes of a “legislative” nature by making law. This is not to
say that the Supreme Court does or should legislate in the traditional
sense; the Constitutional limits of Article III, of course, still apply.
But acknowledging the dual role of the modern Supreme Court gives
place for a view of the Court as a contributor in the policymaking
Congressional discussion—particularly in decisions involving the
dormant Commerce Clause.

1. Supreme Court as adjudicator
The traditional and least controversial role of the Supreme Court
is that of adjudicator. Many framers of the Constitution considered
the Court’s role in the governmental process to be quite limited.
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton insisted that the judicial branch would
be the least dangerous of the three because it would exercise “no
influence over either the sword or the purse,” but would have the
capacity only to render judgments. 116 Under this narrow view, the
Court was to resolve disputes by discovering and applying law that
existed independent of judicial judgment. Accordingly, any true
lawmaking and policymaking were left within the express purview of
Congress. In accordance with this perception, the framers attempted
to insulate the federal judiciary from popular whim by requiring

114. See Scott H. Bice, The Limited Grant of Certiorari and the Justification of Judicial Review,
1975 WIS. L. REV. 343, 379 (noting that the Supreme Court is an “essential policymaking
institution”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1158–61 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme
Court is a “policy maker” while acknowledging the ways in which its policymaking differs from
that of the overtly political branches); Katherine C. Naff, From Bakke to Grutter and Gratz: The
Supreme Court as a Policymaking Institution, 21 REV. OF POL’Y RES. 405, 424 (2004).
115. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Supreme Court as Constitutional Interpreter: Chronology
Without History, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1384, 1388 (1992) (“While the Supreme Court is, quite
simply, a political institution, it would have us believe that this is not so; most of the time the
Court maintains that it is simply engaged in faithful adherence to rules and decisions previously
laid down.”); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 191–92 (1988) (discussing possible political motives behind legal doctrine in support of the
argument that the Supreme Court is political to its core).
116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton).
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judicial appointments to be made by executive nominations and
confirmed by the Senate (whose members were selected by the state
legislators, not by popular vote as they are today) and also by
granting life tenure of federal judges, which could be cut short only
upon bad behavior. 117
Over time, however, the perception that the exercise of the
Court’s adjudicative function merely involved the recognition and
application of common law and positive law has largely been
abandoned. 118 As one commentator noted, “American courts, both
federal and state, do not simply ‘announce’ the law; as much as any
other set of institutions, they make policy.” 119 This realist shift in
scholarly perception of the Court has emerged by observation that
general laws do not always resolve specific legal questions. In those
instances, judges must fill the gap by making law. 120 Additionally,
cases often arise in which judges determine that existing legal rules
are inadequate to serve justice or overarching societal values. 121 In
such cases, judges must make value judgments and engage in
policymaking—a role traditionally thought of as purely legislative. 122
Despite Hamilton’s narrow conception of the Court’s role, the
modern judiciary now appears to be significantly involved in creating
and implementing public policy. 123
Moreover, as the nation’s political structure has progressed, the
judiciary has become more democratized and concomitantly more
informed by public opinion. 124 For example, televised Senate
117. Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 263. One reason for life tenure was to
“enhance the likelihood that [justices’] decisions [would] be based on the merits of the case and
not on political pressure.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 3.
118. See EDWARD F. HENNESSEY, JUDGES MAKING LAW 1 (1994) (“The proposition that
judges merely find the law that was always there is a fiction.”); see also Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of
lawmaking, inheres in most . . . judicial action.”) (emphasis in original).
119. Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire, Introduction to THE JUDICIAL BRANCH, xxi, xxii
(Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005).
120. HENNESSEY, supra note 118.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Hall & McGuire, supra note 119.
124. See, e.g., William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 87, 90, 96 (1993) (concluding that public opinion and Supreme Court decisions
influence each other in an iterative process); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84
TEX. L. REV. 257, 322–25 (2005) (compiling and discussing the research surrounding the
interplay between judicial decisions and public opinion).
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Judiciary Committee hearings are followed closely by members of the
media intending to mobilize mass opinion to influence nomination
decisions. 125 Federal courts also continue to find themselves
enmeshed in provocative policy issues. 126 Engaging in such salient
policy issues forces the Court to be conscious of public values that
often find expression in judicial decisions 127—and rightfully so.
Because government derives its “just powers from the consent of the
governed, the authority of American courts is conditioned by popular
opinion.” 128 Although it is argued that the Court should be
sequestered from public opinion in order to insulate it from political
pressure, public opinion itself serves as a check on potential excesses
by the Court. 129 Since the Court relies on the political branches to
carry out its orders, “it cannot afford to alienate the average
American for very long. Without a basic undercurrent of support for
their actions, the justices cannot expect that their decisions will be
taken seriously by elected officials who, in the end, are the ones who
must translate the Court’s rulings into action.” 130 As a result, the
judiciary, just like Congress, is informed by public opinion and
arguably guided thereby. 131
The modern judicial and legislative processes also exhibit similar
features in two additional and important ways. First, judicial
decisions and federally enacted statutes both govern the behavior of
the population at large. Congressional legislation is directed toward
the entire population, or at least those who fall within the ambit of
the statute, and imposes an obligation on those citizens. 132
Similarly, although the Court’s rulings theoretically apply only to the
litigants before the Court, the precedent set by the Court creates
125. Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 263.
126. The Supreme Court “has become actively engaged in, among other things, the
regulation of abortion, the development of police procedures, the congressional oversight of the
federal bureaucracy, and even the determination of the 2000 presidential election.” Hall &
McGuire, supra note 119, at xxi.
127. See Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 263.
128. Id. at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Id. at 270.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., DAVID G. BARNUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 287–99
(1993) (studying the trend line of public opinion across multiple salient political issues;
comparing them to Supreme Court decisions; and concluding that the decisions closely followed
the public opinion trend line in each area).
132. Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 82, 87–88 (David F. Forte ed., 1972).
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obligations that must be followed by all similarly situated
individuals. 133
Second, the Court imitates the legislative process through the
practice of accepting amicus curiae briefs that bear a strong
resemblance—and have an effect similar to—congressional lobbying
efforts. For example, some amicus curiae briefs are not submitted by
parties with similar or identical interests to those presently before
the Court. 134 Instead, the focus of some briefs has been on the “size
and importance of the group represented[] or on contemporaneous
press comment adverse to the ruling of the Court.” 135 In effect,
these briefs essentially become an “instrumentality designed to exert
extrajudicial pressure on judicial decisions.” 136 In some respects,
amicus curiae briefs have developed into the equivalent of
congressional lobbyists and have become the vehicle for propaganda
efforts. 137 Indeed, many of the voices speaking on policy matters in
the houses of Congress are the same voices heard in the Supreme
Court halls through amicus briefs attached to Supreme Court cases
involving similar issues.138
In sum, the modern Court and Congress exhibit many similar
characteristics in that they are both (1) influenced by public opinion,
(2) engaged in frequent policymaking decisions that impact wide
swaths of the population, and (3) instructed and persuaded by
lobbyists in forming those decisions. As such, it is widely accepted
that the role of the judiciary partakes of a policymaking function. But
it is similarly accepted that the Court is constrained by the
constitutional limits on judicial power. Because of these competing
tensions and the practical similarities between modern judicial and
legislative functions, another permissive view of the Supreme Court
emerges—that of a catalyst for spurring legislative dialogue and
reform.

133. Id. at 87.
134. Id. at 88.
135. Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 88–89.
138. A good example of this is the KFC case’s amicus briefs. Several of those institutions
regularly speak on those issues in congressional hearings.
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B. The Supreme Court as Catalyst for Legislative Inertia
The similarities between Congress and the Court demonstrate
that the Supreme Court can be an active, though limited, player in
the legislative process. Specifically, the Court is in the unique
position to spur legislative dialogue because it is the only other
branch with constitutional authority to make law. 139 Moreover, the
need for judicial intervention is especially weighty when both
branches’ areas of expertise extensively overlap, as they do when a
controversy resides at the intersection of Congress’s commerce
power and the Supreme Court’s negative commerce clause
jurisprudence. Once the Court hands down a decision utilizing the
negative Commerce Clause doctrine, that decision remains
governing law until Congress chooses to change it. 140 Often,
Congress lacks sufficient incentive to push legislation through the
political process unless and until the Supreme Court intervenes. But
once the Court rules, Congress often feels reactionary pressure from
its constituents, and the ruling becomes part of the political
dialogue. By handing down a decision, then, the Court catalyzes
legislative gridlock. As a catalyst, the Supreme Court may be viewed
in one of two roles: Opinion Leader or Discourse Framer.

1. The Supreme Court as Opinion Leader
Some argue that the Supreme Court, because of its prominence
and public visibility, can act as a catalyst for policy reform by ruling
in ways that actually shape the public’s opinion on issues. 141 This
argument, however, appears to be unsupported by empirical
evidence. 142 Rather, evidence seems to suggest that the public reacts
to court rulings according to their preexisting opinions on the policy

139. Although executive agencies create law through their rulemaking and adjudicatory
processes, the Constitution does not discuss this aspect of the modern administrative state.
140. Whether similar intervention by the Court would be permissible in other contexts
will not be discussed here. Although examples of the Court’s ability to spur legislation outside
of the dormant Commerce Clause context will be given below, the purpose of this Comment is
to demonstrate that Court intervention under its dormant commerce power is constitutionally
permissible and in some cases normatively desirable.
141. Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 274 (“Some have argued that . . . the U.S.
Supreme Court can act as an opinion leader by crafting policies that will instruct and persuade
the mass public.”).
142. See id.
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issue, instead of in accordance with the Court’s handling of them. 143
If anything, the Court’s rulings often serve to galvanize previously
held opinions on the issue rather than to sway public opinion in a
particular direction. 144 Public support for abortion, for example,
before and after Roe v. Wade 145 evidenced little, if any change. 146 The
Court’s ruling did, however, seem to intensify both preexisting
support and opposition of abortion. 147 This suggests that Supreme
Court rulings in salient political issues tend to polarize, instead of
change, the direction of political debate. 148 Although the evidence
does not support the conclusion that the Court does, in fact, act as
an opinion leader, the observed crystallizing and intensifying effect
of these decisions on existing public opinion seems to indicate that
the Court’s decisions can act as a catalyst in potentially fomenting
enough legislative fervor to spur otherwise latent congressional
action.

2. The Supreme Court as Debate Framer
Even if the Court empirically does not have the ability to actually
modify existing public opinion on certain issues, it may still have the
power to shape the public debate about those issues. As one
commentator noted, certain courts’ “adoption of specific policies in
the cases that they do decide often provide the specific terms for
popular debate.” 149 The true benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision
(in assessing its role as catalyst or debate framer) may not always be
the substance of the ruling the Court hands down, but rather the
public debate that the decision spurs at the federal congressional
level. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg once explained that the driving
purpose of her dissent in a particular case was to “attract immediate

143. Id.
144. Id. at 275 (“[T]he justices’ policies [often] have a polarizing, rather than a persuasive
effect. Instead of producing attitude change, the Court can serve to crystallize the public’s
existing attitudes, increasing their intensity.”).
145. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
146. Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 275.
147. See Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme
Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 759 (1989).
148. Similar effects were seen after prominent Court decisions on capital punishment. Id.;
see also Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s Conditional Response to Supreme
Court Decisions, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 299, 299–309 (1998).
149. Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 274.
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public attention and to propel legislative change.” 150 She then went
on to demonstrate how her purpose was achieved, noting that
Congress “responded [favorably] within days after the Court’s
decision issued.” 151 Of course, in most cases, the best decisions in
complex social and economic issues are in fact reached in the
congressional halls rather than the Justices’ chambers, but judicial
decisions can kindle the legislative flame of debate and can frame the
debate in a way that ultimately results in the most beneficial and
efficient congressional action.
A few historical examples will illustrate the Court’s ability to
issue rulings that prompt reactionary legislation. At times
reactionary legislative discussion may not always be framed correctly
or result in an agreed-upon normative result. Indeed, in at least the
federal takings example that follows, it is clear that the reactionary
legislation misconstrued the Court’s holding, so the “framing” value
of the Court’s decision was lost altogether. But the following
examples illustrate the fact that the Supreme Court’s decisions
catalyze public and legislative debate about important issues, and
this fact provides a basis for this Comment’s argument that the
Court should intervene to catalyze such debate and generate a final
resolution to the present patchwork of inconsistent standards within
the state income tax realm.
a. Eminent Domain. In 2005, the Court decided the case of Kelo v.
City of New London 152 in which it held that distressed city
governments can condemn private land in order to facilitate areawide, integrated redevelopment projects. 153 The case was received by
the public with widespread criticism because the private property,
once condemned, was given to a private developer for purposes of
eliminating the blighted areas of the city and effectuating a
wholesale redevelopment of the city. 154 Many objected to this ruling
on the basis that it seemed to grant governments the power to
condemn private property and transfer it to another private entity

150. Orin Kerr, Justice Ginsburg and Legislative Independence, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 25,
2007, 12:13 AM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/1193284491.shtml.
151. Id.
152. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
153. Id. at 474–75.
154. Id. at 473. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1423–26 (2006) for a discussion of criticism in the wake of the Kelo
decision.
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despite the general rule that governmental takings be done for
“public use,” as long as doing so would provide incidental public
benefits. 155 Although this was not the holding of the case, 156 the
media and the public latched onto this interpretation and the debate
stimulated various federal and state legislative efforts to curb this
perceived error. These efforts resulted in the initiation of at least
three bills,157 each with different proposals to limit governmental
takings, including one effort at a constitutional amendment. 158 The
legislative aftermath of Kelo illustrates the power of Supreme Court
decisions to instigate public and Congressional awareness of
important constitutional issues and to spur Congress to action. Had
the Court refused to hear the Kelo case, it is unlikely that this narrow
issue would have been thrust to the forefront of congressional
consciousness in a way that would generate almost immediate
legislative action.
b. Free Exercise Clause. In 1990, the Supreme Court passed
judgment on the case of Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 159 In that case, an Oregon law prohibited
the use of peyote, a hallucinogenic commonly ingested as part of
Respondents’ Native American religious rituals. 160 The Respondents
were discharged from their employment and denied unemployment
benefits for coming to work intoxicated. Afterward, Respondents
challenged the law under the Free Exercise Clause claiming that it
infringed their ability to freely exercise their religion. The Supreme
Court rejected this challenge and held that facially neutral, generally
applicable laws that incidentally burden religious practice are not
subject to Free Exercise challenges.161 This decision upended
previous Supreme Court precedent, which provided that
governmental actions burdening religion must pass a form of strict
scrutiny to survive.162

155. John R. Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, Fallout from Kelo: Ruling Spurs Legislative Proposals

to Limit Takings, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A5.
156. See id.
157. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. § 1A (2005); H.R.J.
Res. 60, 109th Cong. (2005).
158. H.R.J. Res. 60, 109th Cong. (2005).
159. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
160. Id. at 874.
161. Id. at 889.
162. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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In direct response to the Court’s decision in Smith, Congress
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 163 (RFRA) to
override Smith and restore the strict scrutiny test that existed prior
to the Smith decision. 164 RFRA directly contradicted the Court’s
holding in Smith and would have required the Supreme Court to
apply strict scrutiny when considering all free exercise challenges—
even those dealing with neutral laws of general applicability. 165
Congress claimed authority to enact RFRA under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment which allows congress to “enforce, by
appropriate legislation,” the substantive guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment.166 As a counter-response to RFRA, the
Supreme Court declared the legislation unconstitutional as applied
to the states because the statute had effectively rewritten, rather
than merely enforced, the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
as interpreted by the Court in Smith. 167 This back-and-forth dialogue
between the Supreme Court and Congress further demonstrates the
power of Court decisions to drive issues to the forefront of
congressional debate and subsequently spur a legislative response.
Although RFRA was struck down for attempting to invade the
Court’s prerogative to declare what the law is, no such separation of
powers problem would arise in a Court decision defining substantial
nexus requirements for income tax purposes. 168 When the Court
decides cases pursuant to its dormant commerce power, such
decisions are subject to constitutionally-sanctioned wholesale change
by Congress as it deems appropriate. 169
c. Business activity tax nexus. The most relevant example in this
section comes from a Court case and legislative response in the
business activity tax nexus arena. This example is especially
instructive in the present analysis because it falls squarely within the
dormant Commerce Clause realm and illustrates perfectly the
Court’s power to elicit legislative response.

163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
164. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 296.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (2006).
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
167. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
168. For support of the Court’s prerogative, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)
(“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
169. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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In February 1959, the Supreme Court decided the case of
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota 170 in which it held
that an out-of-state corporation may establish a substantial nexus for
income tax purposes if it uses employees to solicit orders within that
state’s boundaries. 171 The Court in broad and unspecific language
declared that the determination of sufficient nexus must turn on the
“controlling question of whether the state has given anything for
which it can ask return.” 172 The Court’s ethereal language created
concerns for both businesses and Congress. 173 Most problematic was
the Court’s failure to provide guidance as to the nature and quantity
of contacts that would be sufficient to generate nexus. 174 This
created a terrible lack of predictability for businesses engaging in
interstate commerce and invited the states to broadly define nexus,
as states arguably would need to give very little in order to be able to
ask for at least some return.
Congress immediately became concerned with the potential
burdens the Court’s ruling could have on interstate commerce—both
because of uncertainty to businesses and the wide latitude states
would have to tax interstate commerce—and responded with
astonishing speed to enact Public Law 86-272 as a stop-gap
solution. 175 The purpose of this law was to grant greater certainty to
businesses and states by more narrowly defining the boundaries of
the nexus analysis. In essence, Public Law 86-272 prevents out-ofstate vendors from generating nexus with a state if those venders
only engage in solicitation activities within a market state. This
legislation was intended to be a temporary legislative fix while a
more complete statutory solution could be devised. 176 However,
over

170. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
171. Id. at 452.
172. Id. at 465 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).
173. See Annette Nellen, The 50th Anniversary of Public Law. 86–272, CPA2BIZ.COM (Mar.
27, 2008), http://www.cpa2biz.com/Content/media/PRODUCER_CONTENT/Newsletters/
Articles2008/Corp Tax/Public_Law032708.jsp.
174. See id.
175. Act of Sep. 14 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381–
391 (2006)). Public Law 86-272 was passed within seven months of the Court’s decision in
Northwestern States Portland Cement. See Nellen, supra note 173.
176. Public Law 86-272 prohibits a state from imposing an income tax on out-of-state
corporations whose only contacts with a state amount to solicitation of orders for tangible
personal property from customers within the market state.
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half a century later, no further congressional guidance on nexus
requirements has been offered, and none appears to be forthcoming.
Congress’s immediate reaction to the Court’s dormant
commerce ruling provides an excellent example of the Court’s
catalytic role in propelling Congress to action on state income tax
issues. Of course, the Court’s decision could be criticized for its lack
of clarity, but it appears to have been this very lack of clarity that
engendered enough congressional concern to pass legislation to
correct the perceived ambiguity.177 As explained in Part II, Congress
is unlikely to enact a statute requiring uniformity in the companion
area of state income taxation without a similar external catalyst. The
opportunity is now ripe for the Court to once again step in to either
solve the problem or give Congress a reason to intervene. At a
minimum, a Court decision would provide a measure of
predictability to states and taxpayers until Congress, under its
commerce power, affirmatively legislates on the matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
Inconsistency, unpredictability, inequity, and confusion have
abounded for decades in the area of state corporate income taxation
due to the lack of uniformity in application of state income tax
principles among the states. Effective legislative proposals have been
offered, but due to the misaligned incentives of businesses and
states, congressional legislation adopting these proposals has
repeatedly failed and is likely to continue failing absent some
external catalyst. Over two decades ago, the Supreme Court issued
what appeared to be its final ruling in the area of state income tax
nexus requirements by overtly deferring to Congress for further
guidance. Since that time numerous petitions have come before the
Court seeking constitutional guidance in this area, but the Court has
refused to hear them out of ostensible respect for the separation of
177. Certainly, the Court should not issue unclear or ambiguous dormant Commerce
Clause rulings simply to evoke a response from the legislature. I am simply pointing out that by
their very nature, judicial opinions will never be as complete and comprehensive as full-scale
legislation because the court is limited to the scope of the particular case or controversy before
it. Additionally, the court is often unequipped to answer important policy aspects surrounding
larger issues of interstate commerce. Consequently, dormant Commerce Clause decisions will
most likely leave gaps to be filled or issues to be clarified by Congress. But an important value of
these rulings, clear or not, is their power to draw congressional attention to issues that perhaps
would otherwise be lost to legislative inertia.
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powers doctrine.
However, constitutional doctrines advocating strict separation of
powers do not apply with the same force in the dormant Commerce
Clause realm. This narrow area of constitutional law grants the
Court permission to rule on issues traditionally left to Congress
because it is one of the few areas where Congress has the express
power to overrule the Court’s decisions. Furthermore, as a
functional matter, the modern Court and Congress are both involved
in policymaking. Thus, the Court can and should act as a catalyst and
debate framer for Congress on the important issue of state income
tax nexus and apportionment requirements in order to impose
much-needed uniformity in this muddled area of law. Just as it did in
the sales-tax nexus debate over a half-century ago, such a course will
likely overcome legislative gridlock and incentivize Congress to make
appropriate modifications as it sees fit. In so doing, the Court will
appropriately fulfill one of its modern roles as catalyst for legislative
reform.

Brian L. Hazen *

* J.D., April 2013, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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